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ABSTRACT 
The relatively recent advent of cell phones provides an increasing portion of the 
world’s population with hitherto unprecedented access to information, and offers a novel 
means of networking and communicating within and across societies. Since cell phones 
have been utilized in collective action events such as the Arab Spring, this thesis seeks to 
determine their role, if any, in events that lead to political revolution. Using non-linear 
logistic regression techniques, this study assesses the relationship between cell phone use 
and political revolutions, both democratic and autocratic, from 1980 to 2015. The results 
of the study indicate that there is a strong negative relationship between cell phone use 
and democratic political revolution, suggesting that higher levels of cell phone use 
actually reduce the probability of democratic political revolution, and may bolster 
existing autocracies. We speculate that this may result from governments’ ability to use 
cell phones and social communication technologies for population control and 
suppression; furthermore, the horizontal and decentralized nature of communications 
enabled by cell phones may create amorphous organizations that have difficulty effecting 
government change.  
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Recent advances in the variety, availability and affordability of social 
communication technologies, such as cell phones, provide new methods for accessing 
and sharing information and ideas within and across societies and provide novel conduits 
for communicating with various audiences around the globe, to include audiences in 
previously closed authoritarian environments. With the ability to access the internet and 
conduct two-way communications, cell phones allow users to transcend traditional 
cultural, social, political and geographic boundaries at near-instantaneous speeds, which 
may provide the potential for more effective organized government opposition, or 
alternatively, may provide governments with additional tools for monitoring populations, 
suppressing dissent or propagating narratives. Using multivariate statistical models, this 
thesis seeks to answer the following question: What role do cell phones play in events 
that lead to political revolution?   
Social communication technologies differ from the mass media technologies of 
television, radio and newspaper in several key ways. Social communication technologies 
are characterized by many-to-many, decentralized two-way communications, horizontal 
connections, and include, but are not limited to, social networking sites, text messaging 
and email.1  Social communication technologies tend to form along socially segregated 
lines, and enable many potential senders or broadcasters. Mass media technologies 
consist of centralized, one way, vertical communications, with a small number of 
broadcasters.2   
We chose to focus on cell phones because well documented statistics concerning 
global cell phone subscriptions are widely available. Cell phones allow a large portion of 
the global population to participate in the modern information space and serve as the 
ideal indicator of access to social communication technologies. Therefore, this thesis will 
                                                 
1 T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 308. 
2 T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State 
Sovereignty,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (2014): 15.   
 2 
use cell phone ownership rates as a means to measure countries’ use of cell phones and 
level of access to social communication technologies.     
The quantitative analysis in this thesis finds that there is a strong negative 
relationship between cell phone use and democratic political revolutions, suggesting that 
higher levels of cell use actually reduce the likelihood of democratic political revolution, 
and may bolster already existing autocracies. While many scholars cite the role that social 
communication technologies played in the collective action events of the 2010 to 2011 
Arab Spring, as this thesis will highlight, these events did not always result in political 
revolution.3  Although Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain all experienced 
uprisings during the Arab Spring, only Tunisia experienced a successful democratic 
political revolution following these collective action events. Additionally, we find that 
there is a strong positive relationship between mass media and democratic political 
revolution, suggesting that higher levels of mass media actually increase the likelihood of 
democratic political revolution. Our statistical analysis yielded another surprising finding: 
by far the most predictive indicator of political revolution among the variables we 
examined was a country’s level of polity.4  Chapter III will explain in detail the concept 
of polity, or government type, which is a key aspect of this study.   
  
 
                                                 
3 Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, “What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? 
ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring,” International Studies Review 15 (2013): 64. 
4 The level of polity is determined using the internationally recognized government type scale 
developed by the Center for Systemic Peace 21-point Polity IV data set.  “Center for Systemic Peace,” The 
Polity Project, accessed June 09, 2017, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
A. CELL PHONES  
The increased availability and affordability of information, communications and 
media-viewing technologies provide the potential for a rising flow of information across 
the globe, to include previously closed or isolated societies. Cell phones provide users 
with a variety of functions, including the ability to access an array of internet sites and 
social media applications, communicate via text messages, or check news or market 
conditions. The horizontal nature of communications facilitated by cell phones, with 
many senders and recipients, creates an environment where virtually anyone can actively 
participate in this information community. Some scholars argue that cell phones play an 
important role in democracy by extending the public domain, increasing access to 
information, and reducing the role of gatekeepers.5  Cell phones and social 
communication technologies may provide a novel and effective means for organizing 
opposition against existing governments, though some studies conclude that the internet, 
which is increasingly accessed through cell phones, has not contributed to a global shift 
towards democracy,6 while others argue that these technologies serve to strengthen the 
position of governments.7   
The affordability and availability of cell phones may enable various elements with 
diverse levels of resources to organize widespread government opposition or support 
across vast geographic areas in extremely short time frames at relatively low cost. 
Pierskalla and Hollenbach state, “[c]ell phones as a communication technology allows 
political groups to overcome collective action problems more easily and improve in-
                                                 
5 Heike Hermanns, “Mobile Democracy: Mobile Phones as Democratic Tools,” Politics 28, no. 2 
(2008): 76. 
6 Espen Geelmuyden Rod and Nils B. Weidmann, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats? The Internet 
in Authoritarian Regimes,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 338. 
7 Colin D. Bylsma and Samuel T. Colby, “New Challenges to Authoritarian State Stability: The 
Proliferation of Modern Information Communications Technology,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, 2015. 
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group cooperation, and coordination.”8  Their study concludes that “cell phone coverage 
significantly and substantially increases the probability of violent conflict.”9  It is widely 
believed that these new social communications technologies may have played a role in 
the 2010 to 2011 Arab Spring uprisings by providing “ways to overcome restrictions on 
the freedoms of expression and association.”10  However, the ability to facilitate 
collective action does not always result in effective change in government type. As 
witnessed in Libya, over six years after the Arab Spring, the country remains in a state of 
transition without an effective government of any type.  
Cell phones provide the general population and the government with the ability to 
“live stream” or obtain video or photographic evidence of events, which can be shared 
with audiences around the world almost immediately. Cell phones provide increased 
access to information and improved levels of knowledge for all parties that possess or 
have access to these instruments and networks. Images and videos of police brutality and 
videos of civilians harmed by war have the ability to stir emotions and create widespread 
awareness. These images, which may lead to action from the international community or 
demands to reform domestic policy, are often captured by witnesses using cell phones.   
Others argue that the ability of government to control and monitor much of the 
network and communications infrastructure upon which cell phones rely actually 
strengthens the stability of governments.11  These social networking technologies may 
also provide governments with a “repression technology” by creating additional venues 
for monitoring populations, conducting propaganda and organizing pro-government 
support.12  A study conducted by Weidmann and Shapiro found that during periods of 
                                                 
8 Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell 
Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 
207. 
9 Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell 
Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 
207. 
10 Craig McGarty et al., “New Technologies, New Identities, and the Growth of Mass Opposition in 
the Arab Spring,” Political Psychology 35, no. 6 (2014): 725. 
11 Espen Geelmuyden Rod and Nils B. Weidmann, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats? The Internet 
in Authoritarian Regimes,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 338. 
12 Geelmuyden, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats?,” 338. 
 5 
insurgency in Iraq, increased cell phone communications reduced levels of insurgent 
violence.13  This finding supports an argument that cell phones make it easier and less 
costly for noncombatants to communicate and cooperate with the government and other 
anti-insurgent forces.14  Bylsma and Colby found that the spread of communications and 
organizational media in authoritarian governments actually empowers regimes. The 
authors conclude that higher levels of social communication technologies contribute to 
less violence in authoritarian regimes.15  During uprisings in Burma in 2007 and Iran in 
2009, both of which were suppressed by authorities, activists were able share their 
experiences by posting videos and photographs to the internet.16  However, the 
authorities later used these same videos and photographs to identify individuals for 
arrest.17  A study examining the ability of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad to create 
network outages indicates that “such network blackouts constitute a part of the military’s 
strategy to target and weaken opposition groups.”18  While the capability to share 
experiences and expose potential human rights abuses may help hold all parties 
accountable for their actions, this information can also prove invaluable to those wishing 
to monitor the activities of others.  
Some scholars cite the role cell phones may perform in economic development. 
Economist Jeffrey Sachs states that “[t]he cell phone is the single most transformative 
technology for development.”19  Waverman, Meschi and Fuss conclude, “A developing 
                                                 
13 Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann,”Is the Phone Mightier than the Sword? Cellphones and 
Insurgent Violence in Iraq,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 247. 
14 Shapiro, “Is the Phone Mightier than the Sword?,” 247. 
15 Colin D. Bylsma and Samuel T. Colby, “New Challenges to Authoritarian State Stability: The 
Proliferation of Modern Information Communications Technology,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, 2015. 
16 Sam Gregory, “Cameras Everywhere: Ubiquitous Video Documentation of Human Rights, New 
Forms of Video Advocacy, and Considerations of Safety, Security, Dignity and Consent,” Journal of 
Human Rights Practice 2, no. 2 (2010): 192. 
17 Gregory, “Cameras Everywhere,” 192. 
18 Anita R. Gohdes, “Pulling the Plug: Network Disruption and Violence in Civil Conflict,” Journal of 
Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 352. 
19 “Upwardly Mobile in Africa: How basic cell phones are sparking economic hope and growth in 
emerging and even non-emerging nations,” Bloomberg.com, last modified September 23, 2007, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2007-09-23/upwardly-mobile-in-africa/. 
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country which had an average of 10 more mobile phones per 100 population between 
1996 and 2003 would have enjoyed per capita GDP growth that was 0.59 percent higher 
than an otherwise identical country.”20  Other studies find that the rising availability and 
affordability of cell phones and the reduced communication and interaction costs that cell 
phones provide help to improve market efficiency and individual productivity and may 
lead to a rise in per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP).21  Cell phones may improve 
the economic conditions for millions of people around the globe by improving access to 
markets, banking and other social and economic opportunities, which may increase the 
opportunity cost of revolution and ultimately play a pacifying role among populations.   
As the number of cell phone users around the globe continues to increase, the 
utility of this tool will likely continue to broaden and become more entrenched in the 
lives of individuals around the globe. A 2016 Pew Research Center survey that focused 
on cell phone and smartphone use concluded that “a global median of 43% say that they 
own a cellphone that is a smartphone, which is defined as a cellphone that can access the 
internet and apps, such as an iPhone or an Android. An additional 45% across the 40 
countries say they have a cellphone that is not a smartphone. A median of only 12% 
among respondents say that they do not own a cellphone of any kind.”22  While 
smartphones significantly aid the process of accessing social media applications such as 
Twitter or Facebook, any type of cell phone can perform basic texting and can even 
compose and read “tweets” on Twitter.23     
                                                 
20 Leonard Waverman, Meloria Meschi, and Melvyn Fuss, “The Impact of Telecoms on Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries,” in, “Africa: the Impact of Mobile Phones,” The Vodafone Policy Paper 
Series, no. 2 (2005): 2. 
21 Reuben Abraham, “Mobile Phones and Economic Development: Evidence from the Fishing 
Industry in India,” Information Technologies and International Development 4, no. 1 (2007): 6.; Jenny C. 
Aker, “Information from Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agricultural Markets in Niger,” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, (2010): 48.; Jenny C. Aker and Isaac M. Mbiti, 
“Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 3 
(2010): 208.  
22 Jacob Poushter, “Smartphone Ownership and Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging 
Economies,” Pew Research Center, February 22, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-
ownership-and-internet-usage-continues-to-climb-in-emerging-economies/. 
23 Zachary Steinert-Threlkeld, “Spontaneous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization During the 
Arab Spring,” American Political Science Review 111, no. 2 (2017): 384. 
 7 
In the future, the ability of cell phones to facilitate collective action may play a 
greater role in events leading to political revolution. In accordance with those advocating 
the significant role that cell phones play in political revolution, we offer the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Higher levels of cell phone density increase the probability of political 
revolution.  
B. MASS MEDIA 
In contrast to communications via cell phones, mass media provide a small 
number of broadcasters or senders the ability to disseminate one-way, top-down 
messages to a large number of recipients. The mass media assets of television, newspaper 
and radio, historically the domain of government, may serve as valuable pacifying and 
unifying tools by providing governments with the ability to message large audiences with 
a single, coherent message.24  Based on a 2014 study, Warren concludes, “densely 
constituted mass media systems dramatically reduce the probability of large-scale civil 
violence.”25 Mass media may also serve as a pacifying agent by providing the population 
with entertainment. A study by Kern and Hainmueller found that East Germans who 
watched West German television broadcasts primarily as a source of entertainment “were 
more satisfied with life in East Germany and more supportive of the East German 
regime.”26 
Other studies argue that mass media can promote violence, protests and 
discontent. Joseph Nye argues that the fall of communism in East Germany was due in 
large part to the “soft power” approach of the United States, which projected American 
culture, values, appeals and attraction to influence and shape the preferences of others.27  
                                                 
24 T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 308. 
25 T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State 
Sovereignty,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (2014): 111.  
26 Holger Lutz Kern and Jens Hainmueller, “Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media can Stabilize 
Authoritarian Regimes,” Political Analysis 17, no. 4 (2009): 377. 
27 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2005): 5. 
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Another study found that during the Rwandan Genocide, mass media that encouraged 
ethnic violence significantly increased participation in killings by both civilians and 
militia.28  An analysis on the impact of cross-border radio transmissions in Croatia found 
that after over 10 years of peace, nationalistic Serbian radio broadcasts received in 
Croatia triggered anti-Serbian ethnic sentiment among Croats.29   
The effects of mass media can also be mixed. The impact of mass media is 
influenced by on a number of factors, to include the receptivity of the audience to the 
content of the broadcasts. A study focused on the role of radio in Germany during the 
interwar period in the 1920s and 1930s found that prior to the Nazi party’s rise to power, 
Weimar pro-government radio broadcasts helped to slow the escalation of Nazi 
popularity.30  However, in the following years, pro-Nazi radio transmissions served to 
increase party membership and provoke anti-Semitic activities and sentiment.31  An 
interesting finding concerning the role of radio in Germany during this period concluded 
that anti-Semitic radio broadcasts served to reinforce or exacerbate preexisting 
dispositions, meaning the result was positive in areas with traditionally high levels of 
anti-Semitism and negative in areas with traditionally low levels of anti-Semitism.32    
The source and content of information and messages are also important factors in 
the role of mass media in political revolution. Countries with high levels of press freedom 
allow for a certain level of discourse, which may permit various parties to utilize mass 
media to spread disparate narratives or rally support for their pro or anti-government 
cause. Countries that do not have the ability or desire to prevent mass media 
transmissions from opposition or foreign sources may also experience destabilizing 
                                                 
28 David Yanagizawa-Drott, “Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 4 (2014): 1947. 
29 Stefano Della Vigna, Ruben Enikolopov, Vera Mironova, Maria Petrova, et al.,”Cross-Border 
Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia,” American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics 6, no. 3 (2011): 103. 
30 Maja Adena, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 
“Radio and the Rise of The Nazis in Prewar Germany,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130, no. 4 
(2015): 1885. 
31 Adena, “Radio and the Rise of The Nazis in Prewar Germany,” 1885. 
32 Adena, “Radio and the Rise of The Nazis in Prewar Germany,” 1885. 
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effects of mass media. However, governments that maintain strict control over the 
content of broadcasts may utilize mass media assets as a tool to spread a particular 
narrative and unify the population. In accordance with those citing the pacifying effects 
of mass media, we offer the following hypothesis: 
H2: Higher levels of mass media density decrease the probability of political 
revolution.  
C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Economic development, as measured by per capita GDP, is often cited as a 
critical factor in events leading to civil war and to civil unrest that may ultimately result 
in political revolution. Fearon and Laitin argue that higher GDPs reduce the probability 
of civil unrest and civil war, as higher GDP correlates positively to the state’s ability to 
apply suppressive force against dissenting movements.33  Evidence also suggests that 
higher per capita GDP and improvements in living standards promote democracy.34  
Epstein et al. found that “higher GDP does produce more democratic regimes…[and] 
higher GDP per capita reduces the probability that countries fall out of democracy.”35   
Karl Marx and others would argue that income inequality and a noticeable 
difference in the living standards between the ruling elites and the mass population will 
lead to popular revolution.36  However, despite stark inequality between the ruling elites 
and the general population in North Korea, the North Korean regime has managed to 
survive, perhaps, due in part to the regime’s effective police state and information 
monopoly.37  This continued regime survival in the face of inequality seems to support 
                                                 
33 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no.1 (2003): 76. 
34 Robert J. Barro, “Determinants of Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy 107, no. 6 (1999): 
158. 
35 Barro, “Determinants of Democracy,” 564. 
36 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “A Theory of Political Transitions,” The American 
Economic Review 91, No. 4 (2001): 939. 
37 Jiuen Baek, North Korea’s Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground is Transforming 
a Closed Society (New Haven & London: Yale University Press New, 2016): 39.  
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Thomas Apolte’s argument that the real barrier to revolution is the lack of collective 
action.38  
Based on a 2006 study, Hegre and Sambanis state, “[w]e conclude that a large 
population and low per capita income increase the risk of civil war, and this is consistent 
with many studies of civil war.”39  Collier and Hoeffler also find that higher levels of 
GDP correlate to reduced instances of civil conflict and unrest, citing the possibility that 
higher levels of income make civil war and unrest expensive for potential activists and 
rebels due to lost wages.40  Rising per capita GDP may increase the opportunity costs for 
violence and reduce the incentive to advocate for political revolution.41   
D. POPULATION DENSITY AND URBANIZATION 
Scholars have pointed to the role that population density and urbanization rate 
play in state stability and political revolution. The communications infrastructure that is 
traditionally present in urban settings as compared to rural settings provides more people 
with access to the information environment which may play an important role in popular 
mobilization and political revolution.42   Additionally, more concentrated populations 
that are found in urban settings are more likely to have access and exposure to a variety 
of information and information networks.43  Epstein et al. found that higher urban 
populations destabilize democracy and that population density “promotes transitions out 
of autocracy but has no impact on partially or fully democratic regimes.”44  Collier and 
                                                 
38 Thomas Apolte, “Why is there no revolution in North Korea? The Political Economy of Revolution 
Revisited,” Public Choice 150 (2010): 562. 
39 Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War 
Onset,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, No. 4 (2006): 531. 
40 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 
(2004): 588. 
41 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 
(2004): 588.  
42 Peter G. Mwesige, “Cyber Elites: A Survey of Internet Café Users in Uganda,” Telematics and 
Informatics 21, no. 1 (2004): 83.  
43 David H. Weaver, Judith M. Buddenbaum, and J.E. Fair, “Press Freedom, Media, and 
Development, 1950–1979: A Study of 134 Nations,” Journal of Communication 35, no. 2 (1985): 104.  
44 David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen and Sharyn O’Halloran, 
“Democratic transitions,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006): 563. 
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Hoeffler conclude that countries with highly concentrated populations “have a very low 
risk of conflict, whereas those with a highly-dispersed population have a very high risk 
[of conflict].”45  Based on a 2004 study, Collier and Hoeffler state, “the risk of conflict is 
proportional to a country’s population” which is said to be correlated with both 
opportunities and grievances as the population increases.46  In a 2009 study, Hegre and 
Clionadh find that countries with large populations in which the population centers are 
geographically dispersed are more likely to experience revolution.47  However, it may 
also be that as the number of cell phone users, coverage and infrastructure around the 
globe continues to increase, the physical proximity of individuals to one another will play 
a reduced role in future political revolutions. 
                                                 
 45 Epstein, “Democratic transitions,” 581. 
46 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, 
no. 4 (2004): 588. 
47 Havard Hegre and Clionadh Raleigh, “Population Size, Concentration, and Civil War: A 
Geographically Disaggregated Analysis,” Political Geography 28, no. 4 (2009): 237. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL DATA 
A. ANALYTICAL TIME FRAME 
This study conducts a quantitative analysis of 167 countries with a minimum 
population of 500,000, covering a time period from 1945 to 2015. Fairly consistent 
records exist for this time period across the variables in the study, which allows for more 
accurate and complete results. The dependent variable is Political Revolution, which is 
measured on the basis of rapid shifts toward more democratic or autocratic forms of 
government. The independent variable, Cell Phone Density, is measured as the per capita 
number of cell phone subscribers, while Mass Media Density is measured as the per 
capita number of newspapers, radio receivers, and television receivers. The control 
variables for this study are per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Population 
Density, Urbanization, Polity, and Polity2. The portion of the study covering the time 
period from 1945 to 2000 includes all variables except the independent variable of cell 
phone subscribers per 100 people. Using the time period from 1945 to 2000 to assess the 
role that all variables, except cell phones, played in relation to Political Revolution allows 
for the analysis of data concerning the role that the control variables played in Political 
Revolution prior to and shortly after the advent of cell phones. Owing to the fact that cell 
phones did not have a presence in our data prior to 1981, the inclusion of cell phones in 
the study begins in 1980 and goes through 2015. The inclusion of cell phones in the 
portion of the study covering 1980 to 2015 allows for the analysis of the interaction of 
cell phones with the control variables in relation to Political Revolution. 
B. DEFINING THE VARIABLES 
The prime focus of this quantitative analysis is to explore and analyze the role that 
cell phone technologies have played in events that led to Political Revolution. We will 
also consider the role of older mass media technologies, in addition to a wide array of 
control variables.  
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1. Dependent Variable – Political Revolution 
For the purpose of this study, each country is assigned an annual “Polity” score, 
or level of government, using data from the widely-recognized Center for Systemic Peace 
(CSP) Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015.48  
The Polity IV Project provides a 21-point scale measuring regime types, ranging from -10 
(full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy), with the regime categories of autocracies (-10 to 
-6), anocracies (-5 to +5) and democracies (+6 to +10).49  The Polity IV dataset “covers 
all major, independent states in the global system over the period 1800 to 2015 (i.e., 
states with a total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year; currently 167 
countries).”50  Examples of countries scoring a 10, or full democracy on the scale in 
2015 are Sweden, Germany and the United States of America. In 2015, Saudi Arabia and 
North Korea are given a score of negative 10, or full autocracy. Countries classified as 
anocracies in 2015 include Russia with a score of 4, Bangladesh with a score of 1 and 
Afghanistan with a score of negative 1.   
The dependent variable for all steps of the analysis is Political Revolution, either 
democratic or autocratic. Any country that experiences a change of 5 points or more in 
either direction on the Polity IV scale, which may be cumulative over a maximum period 
of up to three years, is counted as experiencing a Political Revolution. A shift of +5 or 
more on the Polity IV scale over a maximum period of three years will register as a 
democratic Political Revolution, and a shift of -5 or more over a maximum period of 
three years will register as autocratic Political Revolution. The dependent variable in this 
study is binary, meaning every year each country in the dataset is assigned either a 1 for 
autocratic or democratic Political Revolution, or a 0 for no Political Revolution.   
It is important to note that based on the criteria of this study, a 
democratic Political Revolution, or a move up on the Polity IV scale of 5 or more over a 
                                                 
48 “Center for Systemic Peace,” The Polity Project, accessed June 09, 2017, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
49 “Center for Systemic Peace,” The Polity Project, accessed June 09, 2017, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
50 “Center for Systemic Peace,” The Polity Project, accessed June 09, 2017, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.  
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period of up to three years is not possible if the existing Polity level is 6 through 
10.  Similarly, an autocratic Political Revolution, or a move down on the Polity IV scale 
of 5 or more over a period of up to three years is not possible if the existing Polity level is 
negative 6 through negative 10.  Additionally, this study does not account for revolutions, 
such as a military or elite led coup, or other change in regime leadership where the level 
of Polity does not change by 5 or more over a period of up to three years.   
2. Independent Variable – Cell Phone Density 
The independent variable for this study is Cell Phone Density, specifically cell 
phone subscriptions per 100 people within a country. The increased affordability and 
availability of cell phones provide a growing number of people and entities around the 
world with improved access to networks, information and real-time news. Additionally, 
these technologies have the potential to improve peoples’ access to money, banking, 
markets, and the world economy. Values for Cell Phone Density were combined from the 
World Telecommunications Database,51 the World Development Indicators Database,52 
and the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.53  Missing values in each country 
series were interpolated using Stineman interpolation54 and extrapolated using univariate 
exponential state-space smoothing models.55  
3. Independent Variable – Mass Media Density 
Mass Media Density is included in the study as a means “to capture the concept of 
variability in rates of mass media accessibility across societies.”56  As defined by T. 
                                                 
51 “World Telecommunications Database,” International Telecommunications Union, accessed 
October 18, 2017, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. 
52 “The World Bank,” Data Bank: World Development Indicators, accessed June 09, 2017, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators/. 
53 Arthur S. Banks, “Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive,” Databanks International, 2004, 
https://www.cntsdata.com/. 
54 Russell W. Stineman, “A Consistently Well Behaved Method of Interpolation,” Creative 
Computing, volume 6, number 7 (1980): 54–57.  
55 Rob Hyndman, Anne B Koehler, J Keith Ord, and Ralph D Snyder, Forecasting with Exponential 
Smoothing: the State Space Approach (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2008), 12.  
56 T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State 
Sovereignty,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (2014): 124. 
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Camber Warren, the Media Density Index (MDI) is constructed on a country-year basis 
“where TVit is equal to the number of television receivers in use for broadcasts to the 
general public in each country-year, Radioit is equal to the number of radio receivers in 
use for broadcasts to the general public, Newspaperit is equal to the circulation of daily 
newspapers (those published at least four times a week), and Populationit is equal to the 
country’s total population.”57  The MDI is used to measure the level of Mass Media 
Density. Following Warren, we construct the Media Density Index as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
× 100 
Prior to the advent of the internet and cell phones, the technologies of radio, 
newspaper and television were the primary forms of media used for information 
dissemination and consumption. These means of communication provide governments 
with the ability to disseminate messages in support of a defined goal. The technologies 
that comprise the MDI serve as a powerful indicator of state power and “together serve as 
the ideal measure of variation in state capacities to produce soft power.”58  Values for the 
media penetration variables used to create the Mass Media Density variable were 
combined from the World Telecommunications Database,59 the World Development 
Indicators Database,60 and the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.61  Missing 
values in each country series were interpolated using Stineman interpolation62 and 
extrapolated using univariate exponential state-space smoothing models.63 
                                                 
57 T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State 
Sovereignty,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (2014): 124. 
58 Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 124.  
59 “World Telecommunications Database,” International Telecommunications Union, accessed 
October 18, 2017, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. 
60 “The World Bank,” Data Bank: World Development Indicators, accessed June 09, 2017, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators/. 
61 Arthur S. Banks, “Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive,” Databanks International, 2004, 
https://www.cntsdata.com/. 
62 Russell W. Stineman, “A Consistently Well Behaved Method of Interpolation,” Creative 
Computing, volume 6, number 7(1980): 54–57.  
63 Rob Hyndman, Anne B Koehler, J Keith Ord, and Ralph D Snyder, Forecasting with Exponential 
Smoothing: the State Space Approach (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2008), 12.   
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4. Control Variables 
To account for other factors that are commonly cited as influencing Political 
Revolution, this study also includes several control variables. Per capita GDP measures 
the level of economic development and wealth divided by the number of individuals in 
the country. Higher levels of per capita GDP have been shown to be an indicator of 
higher levels of development, improved infrastructure that supports communication, 
higher levels of individual satisfaction, and also higher rates of democratization. Higher 
levels of Population Density and Urbanization64 rates may provide a greater opportunity 
for human interaction and communication and may also contribute to higher levels of 
violence and discontent, which may play a role in events leading to Political Revolution.   
Values for the Population Density and GDP variables were combined from Maddison’s 
Historical Statistics,65 Penn World Tables,66 and the Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation.67  The data for the Urbanization rate is sourced from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database.68  Regime types are measured using the 21-
point scale from the Polity IV project discussed above.69  Polity is used as a control to 
account for the level of democracy in a country at the time of Political Revolution. 
Polity2, the quadratic term of Polity, is included to account for possible curvilinear 
effects. The curvilinear effect accounts for the possibility that anocratic regimes, which 
reside in the middle portion of the Polity IV scale, may be in a state of consolidation and 
                                                 
64 Urbanization refers to the urban population, which is defined by the World Bank as “people living 
in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population 
estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects. Aggregation of urban 
and rural population may not add up to total population because of different country coverages.” 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOT. 
65 Agnus Maddison, “Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita GDP 1–2008 AD,” 
Groningen, Netherlands: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen, 2010, 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm.  
66 Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer, “The Next Generation of the Penn 
World Table,” American Economic Review 105, no. 10 (2015): 3150–3182. www.ggdc.net/pwt.  
67 Spencer L. James, Paul Gubbins, Christopher J.L. Murray, and Emmanuela Gakidou, “Developing a 
Comprehensive Time Series of GDP Per Capita for 210 Countries from 1950 to 2015,” Population Health 
Metrics 10, no. 12 (2012): 2. 
68 “The World Bank,” Data Bank: World Development Indicators, accessed June 09, 2017, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators/. 
69 “Center for Systemic Peace,” The Polity Project, accessed June 09, 2017, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
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transition to either a more fully autocratic or democratic government. These anocracies 
may be more fragile than fully consolidated democracies or autocracies and therefore, 
more likely to experience Political Revolution. A study concerning the stability of 
anocracies found, “intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they 
have had time to stabilize from a regime change.”70  The higher probability of civil war 
in anocracies contributes to the instability of these regimes, which may result in a higher 
likelihood of Political Revolution.  
5. Regression Model 
For this research, the dependent variable – Political Revolution – is dichotomous; 
therefore, we utilize non-linear logistic regression models. According to the criteria of 
our study design, from 1945 through 2015, there were 97 autocratic Political Revolutions 
and 137 democratic Political Revolutions. The main purpose of the models is to conclude 
if there is a relationship between the independent variables and the probability of 
Political Revolution. Ultimately, the study seeks to determine the role, if any, that cell 
phone technologies play in democratic or autocratic Political Revolutions. 
This study proceeds in a systematic manner and includes five steps. As shown in 
Table 1, Models 1 through 5 use democratic Political Revolution as the dependent 
variable and Models 6 through 10 use autocratic Political Revolution as the dependent 
variable. As shown in Models 1 and 6 in Table 1, the first step involves analysis of all 
countries in the study covering the time period from 1945 to 2000, using all variables 
except Mass Media Density and Cell Phone Density. As shown in Models 2 and 7 in 
Table 1, the second step involves analysis of all countries in the study covering a time 
period from 1945 to 2000, and adds Mass Media Density to the first step. As shown in 
Models 3 and 8 in Table 1, the third step uses the same set of variables as the second step, 
but now covers the years 1980 to 2015. As shown in Models 4 and 9 in Table 1, the 
fourth step includes all variables in the study, including Cell Phone Density, and covers 
                                                 
70 Håvard Hegre, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 
1816–1992,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 33. 
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the time period from 1980 to 2015. As shown in Models 5 and 10, the final step uses the 
same criteria as in step four, except the final step includes country-level fixed effects.   
All variables are categorized in country-year format. In order to guard against 
reverse causation all independent variables are lagged by one year. Using last year’s 
value of level of technology penetration to predict this year’s value of revolution will 
help provide more confidence that the causal arrow is pointing in the correct direction. 
Two of the control variables also display heavy-tailed distributions; therefore, the models 
involve a logarithmic transformation to per capita GDP and Population Density.    
20 
Table 1.   Non-linear Logistic Regression Results: Models 1–10 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
In Table 1, democratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent variable for 
Models 1 through 5. Model 1 serves as a baseline measurement and includes all of the 
variables except Mass Media Density and Cell Phone Density, and covers the years 1945 
to 2000. Model 2 adds Mass Media Density to the baseline measurement. Model 3 
maintains the same variables as Model 2, but covers 1980 to 2015. Model 4 and Model 5 
cover the same time period as Model 3, but add Cell Phone Density and now include all 
the variables in the study.   As a robustness check, Model 5 adds country level fixed 
effects. Models 6 through 10 are structured in the same manner as Models 1 through 5. 
However, in Models 6 through 10, autocratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent 
variable.  
The AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) score is used to measure the predictive 
success of models and the most suitable model among a group of models is that which 
minimizes the AIC.71  As illustrated in Table 1, Model 4 has the lowest AIC score among 
the models that use democratic Political Revolution as the dependent variable, indicating 
that both Mass Media Density and Cell Phone Density increase the accuracy of the 
prediction of shifts toward more democratic political structures. Model 8 has the lowest 
AIC score among the models that use autocratic Political Revolution as the dependent 
variable, indicating that Mass Media Density improves the power of the model to predict 
shifts towards more autocratic political structures, but Cell Phone Density does not.   
Notable findings are as follows: there is a strong negative relationship between 
cell phone use and democratic Political Revolutions, suggesting that higher levels of cell 
phone use actually reduce the likelihood of democratic Political Revolution, and may 
bolster existing autocracies. Additionally, there is a strong positive relationship between 
Mass Media Density and democratic Political Revolution, suggesting that higher levels of 
Mass Media Density actually increase the likelihood of democratic Political Revolution. 
                                                 
71 Hirotugu Akaike, “A New Look at the Statistical Model Identification,” IEEE Transactions on 
Automatic Control 19, no. 6 (1974): 716.  
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The level of Polity, or government, is by far the most predictive indicator of Political 
Revolution. 
As detailed in Table 1, Model 1 covers the time period 1945 to 2000 and uses 
democratic Political Revolution as the dependent variable. In Model 1, the statistically 
significant regression coefficient for both Polity and Polity2 are negative (both p < 0.01). 
The lack of statistical significance for per capita GDP, Population Density and 
Urbanization rate when democratic Political Revolution is the dependent variable 
indicates that there is not enough evidence to infer a relationship between these variables 
and democratic Political Revolution. 
In Model 2, with the addition of Mass Media Density, Polity and Polity2 maintain 
a statistically significant negative regression coefficient (both p < 0.01). The statistically 
significant regression coefficient for Mass Media Density is positive (p < 0.05). This 
finding indicates that from 1945 to 2000, higher levels of Mass Media Density 
contributed to a higher likelihood of democratic revolution. The time period for Model 3 
covers 1980 to 2015, and includes all variables except Cell Phone Density. The 
statistically significant regression coefficient for Polity and Polity2 are negative (both p < 
0.01) and for Mass Media Density is positive (p < 0.10), again indicating that higher 
levels of Mass Media Density increase the probability of democratic Political Revolution.  
As detailed in Table 1, the statistically significant regression coefficient for Polity 
and Polity2 (Figure 1) in Model 4 are negative (both p < 0.01). It is important to note that 
in addition to being statistically significant, the results are also substantively significant, 
meaning a shift in the independent variable results in a large shift in the dependent 
variable. This is highlighted in Figure 1, which displays how the probability of 
democratic Political Revolution, shown on the y-axis, changes under different levels of 
Polity, shown on the x-axis. The results in Model 4 suggest that democratic Political 
Revolution, or a shift up on the Polity IV scale, is most likely to occur when the level of 
Polity is roughly negative 2 on the Polity IV scale. According to the results illustrated in 
Figure 1, during the period from 1980 to 2015, there is a roughly 40% higher probability 
that democratic Political Revolution will occur when the level of Polity is between 
negative 2 and negative 3 than when the level of Polity is negative 5. When the level of 
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Polity is between negative 2 and negative 3, there is a roughly 160% higher probability 
that democratic Political Revolution will occur than when the level of Polity is positive 5. 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the findings from Model 4 (Table 1), demonstrating a statistically 
significant regression coefficient for Polity and Polity2. In Figure 1, democratic Political 
Revolution serves as the dependent variable and Polity serves as the independent variable. 
The shaded, semi-transparent region represents a 95% confidence interval for the 
estimated effect. 
Figure 1.  Probability of Democratic Political Revolution as a Function of the 
Polity Score  
In Model 4, the results for Mass Media Density (Figure 2) are statistically and 
substantively significant. The moderately significant regression coefficient for Mass 
Media Density is positive (p < 0.10), indicating that higher levels of Mass Media Density 
may increase the likelihood of democratic Political Revolution, or a shift up on the Polity 
IV scale. As illustrated in Figure 2, democratic Political Revolutions are more than twice 
as likely to occur when the Media Density Index is around 2000 than when MDI is 
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around 50. This finding does contradicts the expectations of Hypothesis 2, which 




Figure 2 illustrates the findings from Model 4 (Table 1), demonstrating a statistically 
significant positive regression coefficient for Mass Media Density, suggesting higher 
levels of Mass Media Density contribute to a higher likelihood of democratic Political 
Revolution. In Figure 2, democratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent variable 
and Mass Media Density serves as the independent variable, with log transformation 
applied to both the x and the y axes. The shaded, semi-transparent region represents a 
95% confidence interval for the estimated effect. 
Figure 2.  Probability of Democratic Political Revolution as a Function of Mass 
Media Density  
In Model 4, the results for Cell Phone Density (Figure 3) are also statistically and 
substantively significant. In Figure 3, on the y-axis, “Probability of Democratic 
Revolution 1980–2015” serves as the dependent variable. On the x-axis, Cell Phone 
Density serves as the independent variable. The statistically significant regression 
coefficient for Cell Phone Density is negative (p < 0.05). The results suggest that higher 
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levels of Cell Phone Density decrease the probability of democratic Political Revolution 
or a shift up on the Polity IV scale. As demonstrated in Figure 3, the probability of 
democratic Political Revolution decreases by roughly 75% when the Cell Phone Density 
increases from 0 to 150. This finding contradicts the expectations of Hypothesis 1, which 
predicted that higher rates of cell phone density would increase the probability of 
Political Revolution.   In Models 4 and 5, the statistically significant regression 
coefficients for Polity, Polity2, Mass Media Density and Cell Phone Density are present 
with and without country level fixed effects in the model, indicating that these results are 
fairly robust.   
 
Figure 3 illustrates the findings from Model 4 (Table 1), demonstrating a statistically 
significant negative regression coefficient, suggesting higher levels of Cell Phone 
Density contribute to a lower likelihood of democratic Political Revolution. In Figure 3, 
democratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent variable and Cell Phone Density 
serves as the independent variable. The shaded, semi-transparent region represents a 95% 
confidence interval for the estimated effect. 
Figure 3.  Probability of Democratic Political Revolution as a Function of Cell 
Phone Density 
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In Models 6 through 10, autocratic Political Revolution is the dependent variable. 
As detailed in Table 1, Model 6 and Model 7 cover the time period from 1945 to 2000. In 
Model 6, the statistically significant regression coefficient for per capita GDP is negative 
(p < 0.01), indicating that higher levels of per capita GDP reduce the probability of 
autocratic Political Revolution. The statistically significant regression coefficient for 
Polity is positive (p < 0.01), but for Polity2 it is negative (p < 0.01). However, as 
illustrated in Model 7, when adding Mass Media Density, the model no longer displays 
statistical significance for per capita GDP, but maintains a statistically significant 
positive regression coefficient for Polity (p < 0.01) and a statistically significant negative 
regression coefficient for Polity2 (p < 0.01). The addition of the statistically significant 
negative regression coefficient of Mass Media Density (p < 0.01) to Model 7 appears to 
nullify the statistical significance of per capita GDP. This indicates that higher levels of 
Mass Media Density decrease the probability of autocratic Political Revolution.   
In Model 8, autocratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent variable and 
covers the time period from 1980 to 2015. Using the same variables as Model 7, but 
changing the time period covered, Model 8 no longer displays statistical significance for 
Mass Media Density or Urbanization rate, but does display a statistically significant 
negative regression coefficient for per capita GDP (p < 0.05). This finding indicates that 
higher levels of per capita GDP reduce the likelihood of autocratic Political Revolution 
during the 1980 to 2015 time period. These results also indicate that higher levels of 
wealth tend to stabilize existing democracies, at least in more recent years. Additionally, 
Polity maintains a statistically significant positive regression coefficient (p < 0.01). 
Polity2 maintains a statistically significant negative regression coefficient (p < 0.01).  
As detailed in Table 1, autocratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent 
variable for Model 9 and covers the time period from 1980 to 2015. Model 9 is structured 
in the same way as Model 8, but adds Cell Phone Density to the Model. It is important to 
note that the addition of Cell Phone Density does not impact the statistical significance of 
any of the variables in comparison to Model 8. Furthermore, the addition of Cell Phone 
Density does not lower the AIC score, indicating that Mass Media Density does improve 
the predictive power of the model, but Cell Phone Density does not. As detailed in Table 
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1, the results for GDP are both statistically and substantively significant. In Figure 4, on 
the y-axis, “Probability of Autocratic Revolution 1980–2015” serves as the dependent 
variable. On the x-axis, “per capita GDP” serves as the independent variable. The 
statistically significant regression coefficient for per capita GDP (Figure 4) is negative (p 
< 0.05). This suggests that higher levels of per capita GDP contribute to a lower 
likelihood of autocratic Political Revolution, or a shift down on the Polity IV scale. As 
demonstrated in Figure 4, an increase in the per capita GDP from around six-thousand 
U.S. dollars to around ten-thousand U.S. dollars reduces the probability of autocratic 
Political Revolution by around 90%. Similar to Model 8, we could also infer that higher 
levels of per capita GDP, or wealth, perform a stabilizing function in existing 
democracies. Statistical significance for Cell Phone Density is not present in Model 9, 
suggesting that there is insufficient information to determine whether Cell Phone Density 




Figure 4 illustrates the findings from Model 9 (Table 1), demonstrating a statistically 
significant negative regression coefficient, suggesting higher levels of per capita GDP 
contribute to a lower likelihood of autocratic Political Revolution. This also indicates that 
higher levels of per capita GDP, or wealth, stabilize existing democracies. In Figure 4, 
autocratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent variable and per capita GDP 
serves as the independent variable, with log transformation applied to both the x and the y 
axes. The shaded, semi-transparent region represents a 95% confidence interval for the 
estimated effect. 
Figure 4.  Probability of Autocratic Political Revolution as a Function of Per 
Capita GDP 
In Model 9, the statistically significant regression coefficient for Polity (Figure 5) 
is positive (p < 0.01), and for Polity2 it is negative (p < 0.01). In Figure 5, on the y-axis, 
“Probability of Autocratic Revolution 1980–2015” serves as the dependent variable. On 
the x-axis, “Polity Score” serves as the independent variable. Figure 5 suggests that 
autocratic Political Revolution is most likely to occur when the level of Polity, or 
government, is around 4 on the Polity IV scale. According to the results illustrated in 
Figure 5, during the period from 1980 to 2015, there is a roughly 5% higher probability 
that autocratic Political Revolution will occur when the level of Polity is around 4 than 
when the level of Polity is around 5. There is a roughly 7 times higher probability that 
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autocratic Political Revolution will occur when the level of Polity is around 4 than when 
the level of Polity is around negative 5.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates the findings from Model 9 (Table 1), demonstrating a statistically 
significant regression coefficient for Polity and Polity2. The result is also substantively 
significant. This suggests that autocratic Political Revolution, or a shift down on the 
Polity IV scale, is most likely to occur when the level of Polity is around positive 4 on the 
Polity IV scale. In Figure 5, autocratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent 
variable and Polity serves as the independent variable. The shaded, semi-transparent 
region represents a 95% confidence interval for the estimated effect. 
Figure 5.  Probability of Autocratic Political Revolution as a Function of the 
Polity Score 
The findings in Model 9 do not support Hypotheses 1 or 2. The lack of statistical 
significance for the variables of Mass Media Density and Cell Phone Density indicate 
that there is not enough evidence to infer a relationship between these two variables and 
autocratic Political Revolution.   
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As displayed in Model 9 and Model 10 in Table 1, it is important to note that 
Polity and Polity2 maintain statistical significance with and without country level fixed 
effects in the Model, indicating that these results are fairly robust.        
A. MODEL ASSESSMENT 
One method used to measure a model’s predictive capacity is through the use of 
the AIC score. In order to measure a model’s predictive ability, AIC provides a score 
based on a model’s suitability for a dataset, while also penalizing the model for its 
complexity.72  Better predictive ability is represented by lower AIC scores. AIC scores 
are displayed in the bottom row of Table 1. As displayed in Models 2, 3, 7 and 8, the 
addition of Mass Media Density in the model lowers the AIC scores in comparison to 
Model 1 and 6, which do not include Mass Media Density or Cell Phone Density. As 
displayed in Model 4 (AIC=781.948), the addition of Cell Phone Density to the Model 
results in the lowest AIC score among those models that have democratic Political 
Revolution as the dependent variable. Despite its increased complexity, Model 4 does a 
better job of forecasting democratic Political Revolution than Models 1, 2, 3 or 5.   
In Models 6 through 10, autocratic Political Revolution serves as the dependent 
variable. As displayed in Models 6 through 8, the addition of Mass Media Density lowers 
the AIC score. As displayed in Model 8 (AIC = 396.876), the addition of Mass Media 
Density results in the lowest AIC score and improves the predictive power of the Model. 
As illustrated in Model 9, the addition of Cell Phone Density does not result in a lower 
AIC score, indicating that Cell Phone Density does not improve the predictive power of 
the model.  
The use of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves is another way to test 
whether Cell Phone Density is a useful forecaster of the dichotomous result of Political 
Revolution within countries or whether it only serves as a proxy for other variables 
present within a country. The production of ROC curves for Models 3 and 4 (Figure 6) 
and Models 8 and 9 (Figure 7) provide a graphic representation of which models 
                                                 
72 Hirotugu Akaike, “A New Look at the Statistical Model Identification,” IEEE Transactions on 
Automatic Control 19, no. 6 (1974): 716.  
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outperform others in predictive situations. In using ROC curves, measuring the area 
under the curve (AUC) is used to analyze the predictive power of models. More accurate 
models will display a greater AUC. When analyzing Models 3 and 4, Model 4 has the 
higher AUC score (AUC = .828) compared to Model 3 (AUC = .818). This indicates that 
the inclusion of Cell Phone Density in Model 4 results in higher levels of predictive 
capacity. In conducting an analysis of Models 8 and 9, Model 9 has the higher AUC score 
(AUC = .8346) compared to Model 8 (AUC = .8342). This indicates that the inclusion of 
Cell Phone Density in the model results in higher levels of predictive capacity, though the 
difference here is quite small.     
 
Figure 6 illustrates the AUC score for Model 3 and Model 4 (ref. Table 1). Model 4, 
which includes Cell Phone Density, has the higher AUC score (AUC = .828) compared to 
Model 3, which does not include Cell Phone Density (AUC = .818). This indicates that 
the inclusion of Cell Phone Density in the model results in higher levels of predictive 
capacity. 
Figure 6.  ROC Curve (Model 3 and 4) 
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Figure 7 illustrates the AUC score for Model 8 and Model 9 (ref. Table 1). Model 9 has 
the higher AUC score (AUC = .8346) compared to Model 8 (AUC = .8342). This 
indicates that the inclusion of Cell Phone Density in Model 9 results in higher levels of 
predictive capacity.   
Figure 7.  ROC Curve (Model 8 and 9) 
B. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The analyses conducted addressed the two hypotheses presented in the study. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the results indicate that higher levels of Cell Phone Density do 
not increase the probability of Political Revolution. In fact, higher levels of Cell Phone 
Density contribute to a lower likelihood of democratic Political Revolution. Regarding 
the role that Cell Phone Density plays when autocratic Political Revolution is the 
dependent variable, we cannot infer a relationship between autocratic Political 
Revolution and Cell Phone Density.   
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Contrary to Hypothesis 2, higher levels of Mass Media Density consistently 
increase the probability of democratic Political Revolution. As illustrated in Model 7, 
higher levels of Mass Media Density during the time period covering 1945 to 2000 
reduced the likelihood of autocratic Political Revolution. We could also interpret the 
results in Model 7 to mean that higher levels of Mass Media Density strengthen existing 
democracies. When autocratic Political Revolution is the dependent variable, as 
illustrated in Models 8 and 9, there is not enough evidence to infer a relationship between 
Mass Media Density and autocratic Political Revolution in more recent years.   
GDP does not appear to play a consistent role in democratic Political Revolution. 
However, as displayed in Models 6, 8 and 9, higher levels of per capital GDP inhibit 
autocratic Political Revolution, or a shift down on the Polity IV scale. This finding also 
indicates that higher levels of per capita GDP serve to strengthen existing democracies. 
In Model 7, the results also suggest that higher levels of Urbanization may increase the 
probability of autocratic Political Revolution, but this finding is not robust across 
specifications.  
As illustrated throughout Table 1, the level of Polity is by far the most predictive 
indicator of Political Revolution. In accordance with Hegre’s findings,73 Political 
Revolution is most likely to occur in regimes that are considered anocracies on the Polity 
IV scale. However, this study also finds that different types of Political Revolution, either 
democratic or autocratic, are most likely to occur in countries with governments that fall 
within different range on the Polity IV scale.   
Throughout all models that use democratic Political Revolution as the dependent 
variable (Figure 8), democratic Political Revolution is most likely to occur when the level 
of Polity is between roughly -4 and -2. Throughout all models that use autocratic 
Political Revolution as the dependent variable (Figure 9), autocratic Political Revolution 
is most likely to occur when the level of Polity is between roughly 4 and 5. These 
findings indicate that strong democracies (polity > 5) and strong autocracies (polity < -5) 
are less likely to experience a Political Revolution.                     
                                                 
73 Håvard Hegre, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 
1816–1992,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 33. 
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Figure 8 illustrates the statistically and substantively significant results for Polity in 
Models 1 through 4. For all these Models, democratic Political Revolution serves as the 
dependent variable and Polity Score serves as the independent variable. Throughout all 
Models, the results indicate that democratic Political Revolution is most likely to occur 
when the level of Polity is between roughly -4 and -2. The shaded, semi-transparent 
region represents a 95% confidence interval for the estimated effect.   
Figure 8.  Democratic Political Revolution and Polity 
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Figure 9 illustrates the statistically and substantively significant results for Polity in 
Models 6 through 9. For all these Models, autocratic Political Revolution serves as the 
dependent variable and Polity Score serves as the independent variable. Throughout all 
Models the results indicate that autocratic Political Revolution is most likely to occur 
when the level of Polity is between roughly 4 and 5. The shaded, semi-transparent region 
represents a 95% confidence interval for the estimated effect. 
Figure 9.  Autocratic Political Revolution and Polity 
C. IMPLICATIONS AND PROJECTIONS 
While there are many different variables that play a role in Political Revolution, 
this thesis identifies some important trends and sheds light on particular aspects of human 
interaction with cell phones and mass media that can help us better understand their role 
in revolution. Based on the results of this thesis, policy makers may conclude that higher 
levels of cell phone use may bolster existing autocratic governments and reduce the 
likelihood of democratic Political Revolution. While cell phones seem to create novel and 
low cost methods of communication and coordination, the liberating potential of cell 
phones may be overstated in regards to political revolution. This may be due in part to the 
potential organizational challenges associated with the horizontal nature of 
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communications enabled by cell phones. As smart phones become more common and 
replace traditional push-button cell phones, these devices may provide another venue for 
media to perform a placating role in society. The increasing availability of games and 
other entertainment available through cell phones may cause prospective activists and 
reformers to spend more time chasing imaginary monsters and watching cat videos on 
their small screens and less time contemplating the ills of society and government.   
The findings concerning Cell Phone Density may also reinforce the importance of 
governments’ ability to monitor, control or shut down the communications infrastructure. 
The potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with heavy reliance on cell 
phones for organizing and directing collective action movements provide lessons to 
potential members of government opposition as well as existing governments. Individuals 
or groups contemplating democratic political change may benefit from more traditional 
means of communication and organization, while existing governments may attempt to 
improve their ability to control and monitor the environment and infrastructure that 
enable social communication technologies.   
The relatively recent advent of cell phones provides a fairly small dataset with 
which to assess the relationship between Cell Phone Density, Political Revolution and 
many other aspects of society. The role of cell phones and other social communications 
technologies is still evolving. The way in which societies choose to interact with and 
regulate these tools is also changing and in some cases taking different paths. 
Governments that choose to tightly monitor and control communications networks may 
experience drastically different results concerning the role of cell phones and other 
communications technologies in future political revolutions than countries that allow 
more freedom of use. The relative anonymity of transactions conducted through social 
communications technologies may allow governments or other opposition elements to 
infiltrate and exploit the networks of the movement. Additionally, reliance on these 
networks often allows governments, or those with access to the appropriate technologies, 
to geo-locate members and follow the activities of the collective action effort.74  The 
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vulnerabilities presented by heavy reliance on the communications infrastructure, and the 
ability of government to also utilize cell phone networks to support pro-government 
efforts, may offer a distinct advantage to the state in the event of an uprising.  
The ability of cell phones to facilitate decentralized, horizontal, grassroots 
coordination does not necessarily engender organizational structures that can institute 
effective and sustainable change. Horizontal organizations, particularly those generated 
by social communication technologies, are often structured along social, political and 
class lines. The “feeds” of those who use Twitter, Facebook or other social networking 
applications are often populated with news stories or updates that are posted by “friends” 
or by people they “follow.”  The information that many people receive through social 
communication technologies is selective in nature. In order to receive news and messages 
through many social networking applications, users must accept a friend request, follow 
an account, or be connected through other “friends.”  The socially, politically and 
economically segregated nature of social networking may only serve to facilitate 
interaction and coordination along exclusive horizontal lines of communication. In the 
event of a popular uprising or gathering in opposition to a central authority, the various 
groups of people who are brought together using social communication technologies may 
have questionable commitment to the cause or causes and significantly disparate 
motivations and goals. This segregation along horizontal lines of coordination and 
communication may inhibit the ability of these different groups to mount an effective 
uprising or form a consensus government following a regime overthrow.  
The study consistently produces results that suggest higher levels of Mass Media 
Density will contribute to a higher probability of democratic Political Revolution, and a 
reduced likelihood of an autocratic Political Revolution. While this is contrary to 
Hypothesis 2, it seems that stronger communications infrastructure required for higher 
concentrations of mass media assets may help facilitate large-scale popular mobilization 
in support of democratic revolutionary movements, particularly in countries with higher 
levels of press freedom. This may provide all parties with valuable information 
concerning the potential role that mass media communications infrastructure could play 
in future attempts aimed at political revolution. At the same time, it may be too optimistic 
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to conclude that simply increasing the Mass Media Density within a country will increase 
the probability of democratic Political Revolution. Press freedom and access to and 
control of mass media networks are also important factors that were not considered in this 
study. When crafting themes and messages, it is also important to consider the receptivity 
and predisposition of the audience to messages.  
It is important to exercise caution concerning the value of mass media in efforts 
aimed at inciting a popular revolution. For instance, some policy makers and scholars 
have contended that increasing the amount of foreign media and information flowing into 
North Korea would help instigate a popular revolution in the “Hermit Kingdom.”  This 
school of thought argues that exposing the isolated North Korean population to the 
outside world will highlight the deficiencies of their government and underscore the 
disparity of their living conditions compared to their southern neighbors. Armed with this 
knowledge, the argument goes, the North Korean people will rise up and demand reform. 
However, echoing the findings of Kern and Hainmueller,75 by giving North Koreans a 
form of entertainment and something to look forward to at the end of each day, foreign 
media and DVDs full of South Korean television may only serve to increase contentment 
and reduce the probability of revolution.    
The results for Polity provide significant predictive results that can aid policy 
makers in assessments of regime stability and potential for political revolution. In order 
to gauge the likelihood of a Political Revolution, the findings concerning Polity as 
displayed in Figures 8 and 9 serve as a very strong indicator of democratic or autocratic 
Political Revolution. These findings may be useful for parties interested in preventing or 
encouraging either autocratic or democratic Political Revolution. Countries with current 
levels of Polity around -4 to -2 are more likely to experience democratic Political 
Revolution, while countries with levels of Polity around 4 to 5 are more likely to 
experience autocratic Political Revolution.  
Countries with very strong autocratic or democratic governments are less likely to 
experience Political Revolution. As an example, North Korea, which stands at a -10 on 
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Authoritarian Regimes,” Political Analysis 17, no. 4 (2009): 377. 
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the Polity IV scale is not likely to experience a democratic Political Revolution, and the 
United States, which stands at a +10, is not likely to experience an autocratic Political 
Revolution. In accordance with the results of this study, the increasing number of cell 
phone users in North Korea also indicate a reduced likelihood of democratic Political 
Revolution.76  Additionally, the North Korean regime’s effective control of the 
communications infrastructure enhances the ability of the government to monitor and 
control networks and interactions, further diminishing the prospect of democratic 
Political Revolution.77   
The popular insurrections of the Arab Spring are often attributed, in large part, to 
the novel means of horizontal, spontaneous coordination that cell phones facilitate.78  
However, this collective action, which may often be unstructured, reactive and 
impersonal, may not have the robust and cohesive organizational configuration to sustain 
a prolonged effort designed to establish or change a government. Additionally, the cell 
phones that enable this coordination rely heavily on a communications infrastructure that 
includes cell phone towers, electric grids, internet lines and Wi-Fi points. Heavy reliance 
on this infrastructure creates a significant vulnerability for the movement. Authorities or 
other adversaries of a movement may choose to shut down this communications 
infrastructure, thereby severely inhibiting the ability of this opposition movement to 
persist.   
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain are examples of countries that 
experienced popular uprisings during the Arab Spring. When comparing the 2010 Polity 
level of the countries to the 2013 and 2015 Polity level of each of these six countries, 
only Tunisia experienced a rise on the Polity IV scale by 2015, and a change to a strong 
democracy (Figure 10).  2010 was chosen as a start date in order to assess the level of 
Polity within each country prior to the Arab Spring events that began in late 2010 and 
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continued into 2011. The absence of graphical representation, as presented in Tunisia in 
2013, in Libya in 2013 and 2015 and Yemen in 2010, 2013 and 2015, denotes the 
absence of an existing government of any type. With the exception of Tunisia, Libya and 
Yemen, all countries experienced an autocratic shift, or a shift down on the Polity IV 
scale. Tunisia experienced a democratic shift in government type, while in Libya and 
Yemen, due to civil war or government transition, there was no defined government type. 
 
Figure 10 represents the level of Polity during 2010, 2013 and 2015.79  The y-axis 
illustrates the Polity score and the x-axis illustrates the country and year. As 
demonstrated in the figure, only Tunisia experienced a rise on the Polity IV scale, and is 
considered a strong democracy.   
Figure 10.  Arab Spring Countries: Level of Polity 2010 to 2015 
Identifying unique circumstances in Tunisia that may have contributed to the 
democratic Political Revolution may provide valuable lessons concerning the nature of 
successful revolutionary movements. However, as illustrated in Figure 11, in comparison 
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to other Arab Spring countries, Tunisia did not have unusual levels of the variables 
included in the study in the years leading up to the Arab Spring. With the exception of the 
level of Polity in Tunisia in 2010, which is in accordance with the findings illustrated in 
Figure 8, it does not appear that we can clearly attribute the democratic shift on the polity 
scale in Tunisia to any of the variables included in this analysis. 
The role of the military and foreign intervention in the Arab Spring countries in 
response to the uprisings are topics that deserve further elaboration and may help explain 
the unique results in Tunisia. Out of the six Arab Spring countries examined in this study, 
Tunisia is the only country where domestic or foreign military forces did not intervene to 
suppress the protests,80 or where the existing military was not directly involved in the 
formation of a new government.81  In some cases, foreign intervention and military 
crackdowns succeeded in stabilizing the existing regimes, while in other cases foreign 
intervention succeeded in toppling existing regimes. However, in every country where 
the military was involved in suppression or reestablishing governance, the state remains 
without an effective government or the level of Polity became more autocratic.     
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Figure 11 represents the level of the variables in the study in 2010 for Arab Spring 
countries.   
Figure 11.  Arab Spring Countries: Level of Variables in the Study 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE FUTURE STUDIES 
To better understand the relationship between communication technologies use 
and political revolution, future studies should focus on governments’ ability to use cell 
phones and social communication technologies for population control and suppression 
and also assess the strengths and weaknesses of organizations and networks enabled by 
cell phones. Additionally, subsequent studies should attempt to identify the reasons for 
the success of the Tunisian democratic political revolution versus the failure of other 
Arab Spring revolutions to achieve democracy.   
Conducting a more thorough analysis of the conditions in Tunisia is required to 
more reliably identify the factors that contributed to democratic political revolutions. 
Some specific areas that may benefit from further research include the role and level of 
foreign intervention, domestic government and military dynamics, and the specific tactics 
used by government and opposition forces in the attempt to suppress dissent or reform 
government. Additionally, identifying the grievances of the opposition is important to 
understand the ultimate goals of the movement and may help to explain the different 
results of the Arab Spring uprisings.      
Evaluating the ownership and control of internet servers, cell towers, electric 
grids and other infrastructure that enable modern communications technologies may aid 
future analyses wishing to assess the potential impact of cell phones and other 
information and media technologies on various aspects of society. Additionally, it is 
important to consider the existing security, both physical and cyber, of the 
communications infrastructure. Furthermore, in order to more accurately evaluate how 
cell phones influence the generation of political revolutions, future studies should 
incorporate a measurement of freedom of the press and evaluate existing laws concerning 
government control of, or interference with, the communications infrastructure within 
each country. Evaluating press freedom and the ability or willingness of government to 
control communications infrastructure can help gauge the level of accessibility to the 
production of media content and also measure the ability of non-government entities to 
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propagate ideas, access content and communicate using cell phone, social communication 
technology, and mass media networks. 
This study also reveals significant findings concerning the predictive value of 
Polity in relation to the probability of Political Revolution. In future studies seeking to 
identify governments at risk of revolution, using the level of Polity as a predictor of 
revolution may help narrow down the field of countries in the examination and allow for 
a more thorough investigation. Additionally, future studies may benefit from assessing 
the potential role that cell phones and social communication technologies may play in 
economic development, and an increase in per capita GDP. This may help identify ways 
to use these tools to help improve not only individual living conditions, but also increase 
the stability of existing democracies.    
Future studies should also consider the rapid pace at which cell phone and social 
communication technology is advancing. As smart phone use continues to increase, and 
as various sectors of society use these technologies for an increasing number and variety 
of transactions, their role may continue to evolve and present different results concerning 
the causes of political revolution than witnessed in this study. The increasing reliance on 
cell phones, communications technologies and computer networks to perform many daily 
tasks throughout society, such as financial transactions and records management, creates 
a possible vulnerability that if exploited by nefarious factions, may lead to widespread 
civil strife and serve as a catalyst for rapid political shifts.   
Future revolutions may occur as a result of hitherto unparalleled and 
unanticipated actions.   It is important to consider the lessons that recent revolutions 
involving cell phones and other social communication technologies provide to all parties. 
Those wishing to suppress opposition and those seeking to reform existing government 
will learn from previous successes and failures. All parties have the ability to alter their 
approach in response to future revolutionary activities, which may produce unexpected 
tactics and results. The results of this study may help policy makers identify potential 
trouble spots and prepare for the possibility and consequences of future political 
transformations.     
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